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Introduction1 
 
Since the mid-1980s, the notion of New Public 
Management (NPM hereafter) or New Managerialism has 
emerged as a key principle penetrating recent shifts in 
governing modes in higher education2 in many OECD 
countries (Braun & Merrien, 1999; de Boer & Goedegebuure, 
2003). NPM - which can be regarded as the policy 
expression of neo-liberalism (notably based on ‘public 
choice theory’ and ‘principle-agent theory’)3 - has 
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challenged many prevailing assumptions about the basic 
characteristics of universities, posing fundamental questions 
regarding the role of universities and the way in which 
higher education is governed in an age of mass higher 
education. Some typical characteristics of the reforms 
associated with the NPM principles were: (1) a significant 
change in the role of the central government from direct 
control (by rules and regulations) to indirect involvement 
(‘steering at a distance’ using contractual policy and/or an 
incentive system based on performance assessment); (2) an 
increased procedural autonomy but less substantive 
autonomy in terms of strategic priority setting for 
universities; (3) a strengthening of the administrative and 
leadership functions within universities, but a weakening of 
the traditional ‘collegial’ principle; (4) a greater emphasis on  
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The purpose of this study is to analyze changing patterns of governance in Korean higher education through the 
window of the NPM, so as to compare policy developments in Korea to wider international trends. Building upon 
Braun & Merrien (1999)'s earlier analytical framework on university governance, the study focuses on the following 
dimensions in analyzing the Korean case: (1) the belief system of the government regarding the role of universities; 
(2) the university-state relationship in terms of both ‘procedural’ and ‘substantive’ autonomy; and (3) the 
distribution of power and authority within individual universities. The results of the analysis suggest that, although 
some typical elements of the NPM governance model can be found, the NPM principles have yet to be firmly 
incorporated into Korean higher education. The study argues that the main reasons for this retardation in the 
implementation of the NPM driven reforms in Korea would be: (1) the general cynical attitude of professors 
towards the NPM governance model which was considered as the legacy of the former military regime and (2) the 
lack of a necessary coherence of government policies over the past two decades (i.e., the heavy emphasis on 
accountability without an accompanying increase in institutional autonomy). The study recommends, as a 
conclusion, that a more systematic and integrated implementation strategy would be needed so as to create the 
necessary preconditions for the NPM principles to be able to work properly in Korean higher education.  
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external involvement (i.e., industry, local government) in 
university decision making so as to introduce a service 
philosophy; and (5) an emphasis on ‘competition between 
service providers’ and ‘consumer choice’ to promote a 
market orientation of universities (Capano, 1999, p. 202; 
Leisytë & Kizniene, 2006, pp. 378-382; De Boer & 
Goedegebuure, 2003, p. 210). This new mode of 
governmental coordination mechanism soon became a kind 
of ‘policy fashion’ in many OECD countries, and, for some 
political decision-makers, it was perceived as ‘a cure-all’ for 
the ills of academic self-governance for situations such as 
spending public funds without accountability to government 
and to society (Leisytë & Kizniene, 2006, p. 378). 
In this context, it is not surprising at all that, as many 
commentators (i.e., Sung, 2003; Kim, 2003) in Korea have 
argued, recent governance reforms in Korean higher 
education have also been considerably affected, though at a 
different pace and to a different extent, by the general 
principles of NPM. What is surprising, given the enormous 
attention being paid to this issue in Korea, would be a lack 
of empirical research on this topic, in particular, conducted 
in the international context. With very few exceptions (i.e., 
Kim & Lee, 2004; Park, 2002; Lee, 2000a), most previous 
research has been conducted domestically (hence written in 
Korean) and the arguments made in these studies were too 
narrowly-focused, often without concrete empirical evidence. 
With this situation in mind, this study attempts to investigate 
the emerging patterns of governance in Korean higher 
education through the window of the NPM so as to compare 
policy developments in Korea to wider international trends. 
More specifically, the study tries to examine: (1) to what 
extent the patterns of higher education governance in Korea 
have changed over the past twenty years; (2) whether these 
changes represent a shift that fully, or partially, incorporates 
the NPM model of governance; and (3) what are the 
facilitating and restricting factors in implementing the NPM 
principles in Korean higher education governance reform.  
With regard to the scope of the analysis, the study will 
focus on the university sector only so as to make a more 
focused and in-depth analysis. In addition, considering the 
fact that private universities in Korea have been traditionally 
treated as quasi-public institutions, at least in terms of 
government regulations and their expected roles, the study 
will include these private institutions for the analysis as well. 
However, particular emphasis will be put on the public 
universities4 as NPM was basically introduced as a strategy 
for the reform of public sector organizations.  
 
 
Analytical Framework: Revised Braun & 
Merrien (1999)’s Governance Models 
 
In order to more systemically structure the analysis, the 
study basically adopts an analytical framework employed in 
Braun and Merrien (1999). They developed a useful 
typology of governance systems in higher education, after a 
critical evaluation of earlier studies on university governance 
(notably, Clark,1983; van Vught, 1989; Berdahl, 1990), to 
allow a better understanding of the complexity of national 
governance arrangements. The typology incorporated the 
following three dimensions as the core elements of 
classifying individual countries’ governance systems: (1) the 
belief system of the government regarding the role of 
universities (universities as cultural institutions vs. 
universities as social service institutions), (2) the role of the 
government with regard to priority setting for universities 
(tight vs. loose control of ‘substantive autonomy’), (3) the 
administrative control of universities by the government 
(tight vs. loose control of ‘procedural autonomy’). In 
accordance with these three dimensions, they classified the 
existing governance systems in the core of the OECD 
countries into six groups as shown in Table 1, concluding 
that the new managerialism (NPM) model emerged as the 
predominant governance mode in these countries.  
In the present study, however, unlike the Braun and 
Merrien (1999)’s original classification scheme, the fourth 
dimension of ‘institutional governance’ (the distribution of 
power and authority within universities: representative vs. 
executive leadership) was introduced so as to more explicitly 
take into account the characteristics of leadership function 
(or power structures) within universities in the models. 
According to de Boer and Huisman (1999), there are 
conceptually two different arrangements for the distribution 
of formal powers within institutions. One is ‘a representative 
leadership’ in which most of the formal powers reside in 
elected assemblies, councils or other bodies; and the other is 
‘an executive leadership’ where the balance of power is 
tilted in favor of executive boards or university 
administration. In practice, the former is usually 
characterized by an elected president typically described as 
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‘first among equals’ and a larger representative governing 
body composed mostly or sometimes exclusively of full-
time professors while the latter is typically represented by a 
CEO-like president with strengthened power and a smaller, 
executive type governing body with a majority, usually 
external and appointed. According to this slightly revised 
classification scheme, the new managerialism (NPM) model 
is characterized as the mix of a state which adheres to (1) a 
more utilitarian stance, (2) an increased procedural 
autonomy (loose administrative control of universities by the 
government), (3) a less substantive autonomy for universities 
(a reinforced role of the government regarding target-setting), 
and (4) a more executive form of institutional governance.  
 
 
Introduction of a New Governance Model based 
on the NPM Principles: Are we there yet? 
 
In relation to governance reform in Korean higher 
education, two of the most important turning points would 
be (1) 'the June 10 democratization movement' in 1987 and 
(2) 'the May 31 education reform plan' in 1995. ‘The June 10 
democratization movement’ in 1987 was the single most 
important historical turning point in Korea’s democratization 
process which brought about not only the collapse of the 
former military regime but fundamental changes in 
governance patterns within universities. ‘The May 31 
Education Reform Plan’ would be the first and foremost 
comprehensive attempt at making real changes to the way in 
which the higher education system is governed, and at the 
same time represented the first step in an attempt to build a 
policy strategy based on the principles of NPM. As 
described below, these two symbolic events had a massive 
impact on the developments of higher education governance 
in Korea over the past twenty years. 
 
Belief System of the Government regarding the Role of 
Universities  
 
The belief system of the government concerning the 
role of universities resides in a continuum based on either 
cultural or utilitarian values. Cultural values would 
emphasize (1) the disinterested pursuit of knowledge 
unconnected to the trivial realities of the world of economics, 
Table 1  
Revised Braun and Merrien (1999)’s Governance Models 
Institutional Autonomy* 
Belief System 
Procedural Substantive 
Institutional Governance 
Model 
Cultural Utilitarian tight loose tight loose
Representative 
(collegial) 
Executive 
(entrepreneurial)
① Collegium (UK in 1983) O   O  O O  
② Market (U.S. in 1983)  O  O  O  O 
③ Bureaucratic-Oligarchic 
(W. Germany, Italy, Switzerland in 1983) 
O  O   O O  
④ New Managerialism (NPM) 
(Most Western Countries in the 1990s) 
 O  O O   O 
⑤ Bureaucratic-Statist 
(Sweden in 1983) 
O  O  O  O  
⑥ Coporatist-Statist 
(Former Soviet Union) 
 O O  O   O 
Note. The distinction between substantive (‘what to do’) and procedural autonomy (‘how to do’ in order to fulfill the different 
functions of universities) was originally made by Berdahl (1990 in Braun & Merrien, 1999, p. 21) 
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given the understanding that in such pursuit, the goals of 
society are best met in the long run; (2) the performance of 
universities should and could not be measured in market 
terms as the worthiness of universities cannot soley be 
measured in market terms; and (3) academic liberty is a 
sacred value and the academic defends the intrinsic value of 
his or her goals, rejecting all potentially corrupting attempts 
to pressurize or intervene. On the contrary, utilitarian values 
emphasize that (1) knowledge should be pursued for the 
purpose of meeting socially determined goals, thereby being 
more responsive to social, political, and economic demands; 
(2) quasi-public institutions, such as universities, visibly 
present useful and applicable results linked to an assessment 
procedure in terms of money input and output; and (3) the 
state should steer in a supervisory instead of an 
interventionist fashion and market-like relations would 
render more efficient the public administration’s service 
(Braun & Merrien, 1999; Kogan & Marton, 2000). As Braun 
and Merrien (1999) contended, over the last two decades, 
there has been a remarkable change in government attitude 
concerning the role of universities above all in Europe: from 
the belief system based on cultural values to the one which 
regards universities more and more in a utilitarian fashion as 
public service institutions. According to them, this very shift 
in government belief systems, indeed, evoked a new policy 
framework (NPM) affecting the new mode of governance in 
higher education. 
The belief system of the Korean government has been 
generally following a similar direction as observed in the 
European countries. As the legacy of the Kyung-sung 
Imperial University (the first ‘modern’ university on the 
Korean peninsula and the predecessor of Seoul National 
University, SNU hereafter)5 - established during Japanese 
colonial rule and deriving its founding principles from the 
Humboldtian research university - the cultural belief system 
was deep-rooted in the mindset of most professors, 
particularly in humanities and law disciplines, which were 
most heavily influenced by the European cultural 
tradition(Jeong, 2006; Umakoshi, 2000).  
On top of this colonial or European heritage, since the 
liberation from colonial rule in 1945, a strong U.S. influence 
has swept through the formation and subsequent developments 
of the Korean higher education system, which has made the 
situation more complicated. In particular, U.S. assistance for 
the re-training and nurturing of faculty members at SNU and 
a few other reputable private universities (i.e., Korea and 
Yonsei university) at an early stage of Korean higher 
education development (in the 1950s-60s) had a profound 
impact on subsequent developments of Korean higher 
education (Umakoshi, 2000). Actually, with this strong U.S. 
support as a springboard, those who had studied in the U.S. 
soon made up the majority of the faculty in the major 
Korean universities (including SNU)6 and started to serve as 
a kind of channel through which the U.S. belief systems and 
institutions were introduced into Korean universities. In this 
context, it is not unreasonable to assume that the utilitarian 
belief systems rooted in the U.S. universities has been 
gradually infiltrated since then into the Korean academic 
community. However, overall, as Jeong (2006) has argued, it 
may be fair to say that both the cultural and utilitarian belief 
systems had been quite balanced up until the early 1990s in 
governing the higher education system in Korea.  
From the early 1990s, and in particular since 1995, 
however, the balance between the two belief systems seems 
to have been tilting in favor of the utilitarian belief system. 
‘The May 31 education reform plan’ represents an important 
and critical turning point in this regard. The plan and 
subsequent reports prepared by the Presidential Commission 
on Education Reform (PCER hereafter) reiterated that ‘the 
universities as the prime source of knowledge production 
and delivery should be encouraged to become more market-
oriented and to link their development more closely to 
societal needs, most notably to the changing needs of the 
labor market’ (i.e., Park, 2000; PCER, 1996). Since then, the 
government has more overtly than before announced its 
intention to vigorously introduce a service philosophy and a 
market orientation into Korean higher education institutions. 
Such symbolic keywords as ‘higher education industry’, 
‘consumer orientation’, ‘competition’ and ‘marketization’ 
representing this changed belief system, are now commonly 
found in Presidential addresses, government documents and 
legislation in Korea. In this regard, one may conclude that, at 
least at the formal and legal levels, there has been a clear 
shift in the ideas on the purpose of the universities in Korea 
over the past two decades. 
After all, “the referential institution - the prime source 
of ‘good practice’ from which standards are set and 
procedures taken over and emulated (Neave, 2001, p. 60)” 
for the Korean universities has become more and more ‘a 
corporate enterprise’ rather than a traditional notion of a 
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cultural institution (a so-called ‘ivory tower’).  
 
Relationship between the State and Universities 
(Institutional Autonomy) 
 
Procedural autonomy (administrative control of 
universities by the government).  Traditionally, the Korean 
government has maintained tight control over both public 
and private university operations7. Up until the early 1990s, 
almost all aspects of university operations even for the 
private sector institutions were subject to detailed 
government regulations which included: (1) the 
establishment of a university; (2) the establishment of an 
academic program or department, (3) enrollment quotas, (4) 
the admission procedures and methods, (5) tuition levels, (6) 
the requirements for graduation, and (7) qualification of 
professors (Lee, 2000a, pp. 413-414). 
In 1995, however, there was a major shift in the 
regulatory policy on higher education taking ‘the May 31 
education reform plan’ as an important platform. ‘Full 
development of school autonomy and reduction of 
government regulation’ was, indeed, one of the five reform 
principles laid out in the plan (Park, 2000, pp. 16-17). The 
reforms carried out since then have generally aimed at 
increasing the autonomy of the universities, in particular, for 
private universities. Enrollment quotas were eliminated for 
private universities except those in the Capital region (Seoul, 
Incheon Metropolitan City and the surrounding Gyung-gi 
Province). The rules for the establishment of a new private 
institution were liberalized and the government guidelines 
for tuition fees were abolished. Greater freedom has been 
granted to the universities to establish new departments, 
design curricular, decide requirements for graduation, and 
the nature of their teaching activities (KEDI, 2006; Kim & 
Lee, 2004). As a result, private universities currently enjoy 
considerable freedom in a wide range of their activities, 
although the government still maintains control over some 
areas of university management (i.e., setting the student 
selection criteria, the composition of governing boards) to 
protect ‘wider public interests.’  
For public universities, however, the government still 
maintains a higher degree of control over most areas of 
institutional management including personnel, organization, 
and capital even after the  series of reforms since 1995. 
Despite considerable time and effort spent by the 
government so far8, regulations are still pervasive and 
institutional autonomy has not been substantially increased. 
Table 2 highlights the current situation of institutional 
autonomy in Korean public universities compared to their 
counterparts in other OECD countries.  
As is manifest in Table 2, Korean public universities 
have very limited autonomy over a large part of university 
management which has resulted in the Korean universities 
being ranked last, in terms of the extent of institutional 
autonomy, among the 9 OECD countries concerned. On the 
contrary, it is interesting to note that national universities in 
Japan have made fundamental progress with regard to 
institutional autonomy when comparing the present rank to 
the one in 2003 before being transformed into national 
university cooperation in 2004. As shown in Table 2, the 
Japanese national universities at the present time enjoy a 
higher level of autonomy over most areas of institutional 
management. Judging from this empirical reality, one may 
assume that without having to change their legal status, it 
would be hardly possible to fundamentally increase 
institutional autonomy of public universities in Korea.  
 
Substantive autonomy (the role of the government 
regarding priority setting for universities). Braun and 
Merrien (1999) indicated that, “[t]he increased role of 
governments with regard to priority setting, which is 
engendered by the new managerialism [NPM] model implies 
[1] the earmarking of university funds, [2] the 
contractualization of state-university relations and [3] the 
assessment of goal achievement and the quality of the 
university output by evaluation measures (27).” As will be 
shown below, these three features represent precisely the 
developments having taken place in Korean higher education 
since the mid-1990s.  
In 1994, for the first time, the government initiated a 
competitive grant program (‘Guk-Chak-Gong-Dae Sa-up’: 
which roughly translates  as ‘National Engineering College 
Fostering Project’) to provide (earmarked) resources for 
strengthening engineering programs and developing new ties 
between universities, business and industry. Before 1994, in 
fact, all government money for universities was basically 
allocated using mathematical formulae, only reflecting 
incremental changes in personnel, enrolment, and unit cost 
without designating specific strategic goals for the grants by 
the government. 
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Table 2  
Extent of autonomy experienced by universities across 9 OECD countries in 2007 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Institutions are 
free to: 
Own their 
buildings and 
equipment 
Borrow 
funds 
Spend 
budgets to 
achieve their 
objectives
Set academic 
structure 
/course 
content 
Employ and 
dismiss 
academic 
staff2 
Set salaries2 
Decide size 
of student 
enrolment3 
Decide level 
of tuition 
fees 
Netherlandsss ● ● ● ◐ ● ● ● ◐ 
Poland4 ● ● ● ◐ ● ◐ ● ◐ 
Australia ● ◐ ● ● ● ● ◐ ◐ 
UK ● ◐ ● ● ● ● ◐ ◐ 
Japan5 ● ◐ ● ◐ ● ● ◐ ◐ 
Denmark ◐ ● ● ◐ ● ◐ ● ◐ 
Sweden ◐ ◐ ● ● ● ● ◐  
Finland ◐  ● ◐ ● ● ◐  
Korea6    ◐ ◐   ● 
Japan (2003)    ◐ ◐    
Legend: Aspects in which institutions: ● have autonomy; ◐ have autonomy in some respects.  
Notes: 1. Data in Table 2 are based on responses to a follow-up of the 2003 OECD survey of university governance administered by the 
author in July 2007. National experts mostly participating in the OECD project ‘Thematic review of tertiary education’ were consulted 
whether or not any changes in university autonomy have taken place since 2003 when the first survey was originally administered. Out of 
14 countries included in OECD (2003), 9 countries responded to the follow-up survey. Countries are ranked in order of the number of 
areas in which universities reported autonomy. Details on aspects of university autonomy in Poland, Japan, and Korea are provided in 
Notes 4, 5, and 6, respectively. See the Appendix of OECD(2003) for the rest of the countries where the situation has basically remained 
unchanged since 2003. The number in parenthesis refers to the column in the Table. 
2. “Employ and dismiss academic staff” (column 5) and “Set salaries” (column 6) include cases where any legal requirements for minimum 
qualifications and minimum salaries have to be met. 
3. “Decide size of student enrolment” (column 7) includes cases where some departments or study fields have limits on the number of 
students able to enroll. 
4. Poland: (4) The decision on the establishment of a new degree program and the entrance capacity in a given field and at a given level of 
study is taken by the government based on the opinion of the State Accreditation Committee.  
5. Japan(National): (2) Long-term borrowing should be approved by the government; (4) Changes in the organization of a faculty should be 
approved by the government if the type of degree awarded is changed accordingly (The organizational structure of national universities 
should be written in a mid-term plan of each individual institution with its revision subject to government approval); (7) Institutions can 
determine their entrance capacity provided that they can meet the criteria pre-set by the government (i.e., the student/faculty ratio, per 
capita facilities etc); (8) Tuition fees are subject to government ceilings (less than 20% higher than the standard tuition fee level).  
6. Korea (National/Public): (4) The creation of new academic departments at the undergraduate level requires government approval. At the 
graduate level, the decision to create departments and majors is devolved to individual institutions if it falls within a total enrollment 
quota; (5) The decisions regarding employment and dismissal of academic staff are taken by the university concerned. The number of 
positions, however, is subject to government control; (8) At the present time, there is no official guideline or ceiling for tuition levels. In 
reality, however, it is practically very difficult for individual universities to drastically increase tuition levels because of strong opposition 
from students and (some) politicians.  
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Greater critical momentum accelerating this new 
funding framework, however, was initiated by ‘the May 31 
Education Reform Plan’ in 1995. In this plan, the PCER 
made a recommendation to the President of the Republic that 
“[t]he autonomy of a university entails its educational 
programs to be evaluated, and government support will 
inevitably be linked to the result of the evaluation…The 
governmental support of a university will be based on the 
results of the self-evaluation and the external evaluation 
(PCER, 1996, pp. 38-39).” Actually, this recommendation 
has had a great impact on the government's subsequent 
funding policy. Since then, all the major funding programs 
have been rearranged following this direction where the 
government has played an important role through the 
mechanism of evaluating institutions' achievement against 
pre-determined criteria.  
In particular, for ‘the BK(Brain Korea) 21 Project (the 
Phase one: 1999~2005; the Phase two: 2006~12)’ and ‘the 
NURI (New universities for Regional Innovation) Project 
(2002~2008)’ which are regarded as the largest government 
funding programs for universities9, a contractualization 
arrangement was introduced between the government and 
individual universities to better ensure institutional 
accountability. For instance, universities selected to 
participate in the BK 21 project in 1999 were required to 
implement restructuring programs by contracts made 
between each individual university and the government. 
Some of the main points of these requirements included: (1) 
to reform the university’s admission policy and procedures 
following the governmental framework; (2) to restructure 
narrowly specialized organization of undergraduate 
programs into broader clusters of courses of study and to 
expand the enrolment of graduate programs by reducing 
undergraduate enrolment by 25 percent; and (3) to improve 
the faculty appointment system by introducing a systematic 
evaluation of individual performance against international 
standards and a contract system (Lee, 2000a, p. 421). In the 
case of universities’ breaching the contract or being unable 
to meet pre-agreed goals between the two parties, there were 
penalties imposed by the government usually in the form of 
suspension or reduction of government grants. As OECD 
(2003) aptly pointed out, a critical point in this context 
would be, namely, ‘who determines the goals and the 
criteria’ on which performance assessments will be based. 
When the goals and evaluation criteria are largely 
determined by the government, driven by administrative or 
political interests, they then, in practice, function as a kind of 
regulatory device for universities. In this situation, “a 
government that is not directly managing an institution can 
exert an indirect, yet powerful form of control (OECD, 2003, 
p. 71).”  
In sum, the role of the government with regard to 
priority setting for universities has been increased, rather 
than decreased, over the past two decades. Put another way, 
substantive autonomy from the individual institutions’ point 
of view has been largely decreased in both public and private 
universities in Korea. 
 
Institutional Governance (the distribution of power and 
authority within universities)10 
  
Traditionally, internal governance in public universities 
in Korea was the exclusive domain of a single person, the 
president of a university appointed by the government11. As 
described earlier, ‘the June 10 democratization movement’ 
in 1987 and subsequent reforms in higher education brought 
this dominance to an end. In the higher education area, one 
of the first steps after social democratization in 1987 was (1) 
to establish a professors’ association and a University Senate 
(the Senate hereafter) as a representative body of the 
professors’ association12 at an institutional level and (2) to 
introduce an election system by full-time professors for a 
university president. These two newly introduced features 
were rapidly incorporated into the institutional governance 
structure, and the principle of self-government by full-time 
professors was firmly established and has been largely 
unchallenged since then in most public universities 
(including some reputable private institutions as well). 
As a result of these reforms, both the president and 
deans are elected by full-time professors and accountable 
mainly to the academic community which is represented by 
the Senate. Therefore, the president finds it difficult to adopt 
unpopular decisions as their election and re-election depend 
on the academics. Furthermore, in many public institutions, 
university statutes require that for many important decisions, 
a president ‘should’ receive the Senate’s approval13 
regardless of the current legislation seemingly prohibiting 
such practices (Song & Han, 2005; Lee, 2000b). In this 
respect, the powers of the administrative staff (notably a 
president) are limited, and on many occasions the university 
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administration becomes ‘a hostage of the Senate majority 
(Želvys, 2004).’ Some academics (i.e., Kim, 2003) have 
argued that Korean universities have been traditionally 
characterized by a higher concentration of power in the 
hands of a president and that the previous two decades have 
not appreciably weakened the president’s position. This 
argument is true in a sense that the president still has, at least 
by a legal definition, the ultimate authority on all important 
institutional matters. However, at the public universities at 
least (and some reputable private universities as well), it is 
an illusion to believe that a president can impose important 
decisions against the will of the academics. Under the 
existing scheme of self-government by professors, therefore, 
essential structural and functional internal reforms in the 
public universities are hardly possible (Park, 2004, pp. 9-13).  
Another important issue with regard to institutional 
governance would be to bring external representatives (i.e., 
industry, local governments) into higher education governance. 
In Korea, participation from external stakeholders on 
university governing or supervisory bodies is very rare, if at 
all, and usually plays a rather passive role. An analysis of the 
current statutes of 23 four-year national universities in Korea 
revealed that only 3 universities (SNU, Busan National 
University, and Changwon National University) currently 
allow, though in limited numbers, external representatives to 
participate in the University Senate. Moreover, the average 
attendance rate of these external members at the general 
meetings of the Senate has been reported to be fairly low14, 
which in turn, signifies the very limited role played by the 
external members in university decision making in Korea . 
In summary, the Senate, dominated by full-time 
professors, has indeed emerged as the de facto supreme 
governing body at most public universities over the past two 
decades in Korea. Despite drastically increased powers 
granted to the Senate, however, it seems that the academics 
in Korean universities constituting the Senate are still not 
used to accepting practical responsibility for the consequence of 
their managerial decisions15. As Želvys (2004) has put it, 
“[p]ower without responsibility is a dangerous combination 
in governing any organization, especially such a large and 
complicated organization as university (p. 9).”  
 
An Overview of Changing Patterns of Governance in 
Korean Higher Education 
 
Figure 1 shows changing patterns of governance in 
Korean higher education over the last twenty years (from 
1987 to 2007). The outermost quadrangle represents a 
conceptual NPM governance model characterized by: (1) the 
predominance of the utilitarian belief system, (2) increased 
autonomy in procedural matters, (3) less substantive 
autonomy for priority setting, and (4) strong executive 
leadership. Of course, this is a considerably simplified 
version of the model to lend clarity to the arguments of the 
study. The other two inner quadrangles represent the 
governance models for Korean universities in 1987(indicated 
by the dotted line) and in 2007(by the bold line), respectively.  
From Figure 1, as indicated by the arrows, one can 
observe general shifts, on the first three dimensions, towards 
the conceptual NPM governance model (in the direction of a 
more utilitarian belief system, more procedural freedom, and 
less substantive autonomy) with considerable variations 
among these three dimensions. However, in general, it seems 
that these shifts have not yet reached the extent which the 
conceptual model envisaged, in particular, on the dimension 
of procedural autonomy. When it comes to the fourth 
dimension of institutional governance, however, the 
direction of the shift is opposite to the conceptual model of 
NPM governance which indicates a new mode of 
institutional governance based on the NPM principles 
(‘executive’ or ‘entrepreneurial’ leadership model) has not 
gained a foothold within universities in Korea. Quite the 
contrary, over the past two decades, features of a 
representative (or collegial) leadership model seem to have 
become more and more reinforced in Korean universities. 
Based on the analysis of the study, therefore, although 
some typical elements of the NPM governance model (i.e., 
the utilitarian belief system of the government, tight control 
of substantive autonomy for universities) are now evident in 
the patterns of governance in Korean higher education, it 
would hardly be true to say at the moment that the NPM 
principles have been firmly incorporated into Korean higher 
education governance. Rather, it would be safe to conclude 
that introducing the NPM principles into Korean higher 
education is still one of the major governmental reform aims 
for which a more appropriate implementation approach 
should be sought. The remaining section of this study will be 
devoted to exploring (1) why this retardation in 
implementation of the NPM-based reforms has occurred 
despite all the efforts the government has invested so far; 
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and (2) how to successfully implement the NPM principles 
in the Korean higher education context. 
 
 
Implementation of the NPM principles in 
Korean Higher Education: Issues & Problems 
 
The most common account for the retardation in the 
implementation of the NPM-based reforms may be 
explained by the general problems associated with the ‘top-
down’ approach adopted by the Korean government. As is 
often the case in many other OECD countries, including 
Korea, the central government was the prime mover to 
introduce the NPM-driven policy initiatives. Under this 
implementation scheme, faculty and institutional leadership 
rarely became stakeholders or were committed to the desired 
reform efforts and thus, the results seem to lend themselves 
more to a paper-based performance and accountability rather 
than any substantial, enduring change in the educational 
process. This lack of legitimacy within universities and the 
ensuing half-heartedness of university constituencies have 
led to the delay in the implementation of the reforms based 
on the NPM principles. Clearly, this line of explanation 
which is frequently found in many previous studies (i.e., 
KEDI, 2006; Shin, 2005; Sung, 2003) in Korea has some 
value. However, more fundamental factors behind this 
common account seem far more nuanced in explaining the 
Korean case.  
In Korea, there are still considerable forces in the 
political and academic community which oppose the NPM 
governance model based on neo-liberal ideology. In 
particular, most academics remained skeptical with regard to 
the introduction of the NPM principles in universities and 
above all to change the existing governance structures within 
universities (notably, an election system of a university 
president) which was frequently celebrated as a major 
triumph of broader social democratization during the late 
1980s. This study argues that these general cynical attitudes 
held by most professors towards the NPM governance model 
(in particular towards strong executive leadership and state 
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intervention by means of various accountability measures) 
could be said to be one of the main reasons which has 
hindered the NPM governance principles from being deeply 
incorporated into the Korean universities over the last two 
decades.  
The study goes on to argue that the prevailing 
atmosphere of Korean professors against the NPM 
governance model is, at least in part, due to the legacy of the 
former military regime. The 30 years’ experience of 
authoritarian governments under the military regime has left 
a deep mark on social structures and rules, on cultural values, 
beliefs and norms. Therefore, it is quite reasonable to 
assume that a distrust and explicit rejection of the role of the 
government and of a strong institutional leader in university 
affairs had been developed and embodied in the mindset of 
most academics (and to some extent the general public) in 
Korea. As a result of this, at least in the immediate period 
following ‘the June 10 democratization movement’ in 1987, 
anything evocative of the former military regime was 
abolished at both public and private universities, including 
appointed presidents or deans as government representatives 
(or representatives of founders in the case of private 
universities). Election, without any question, became a 
common method of selecting institutional leaders in most 
universities and there was no room at all to consider any 
other alternatives in terms of the powers and competencies 
of presidents or deans as effective managers of higher 
education institutions. The prevailing atmosphere at that 
time was a radical ideological stance with as little as possible 
of any type of external intervention and with an almost 
unlimited faith in collegial self-government borrowed from 
the classical Humboldtian-type governance model16.  
These reactions were quite understandable at a time of 
vigorous social democratization after a long period of highly 
authoritative and bureaucratized government control over 
university governance. In addition, it is no wonder that the 
academics seem to be quite content with the current 
governance structure where full-time professors dominate all 
important decisions of university management and oppose 
any reforms that could challenge the existing status quo. As 
indicated by Matějů & Simonová (2003) for the Czech case, 
however, “almost complete self-government granted to 
universities in advance of a much deeper and more 
consistent reform of the system made future reforms more 
difficult, if not impossible (pp. 6-7).” In other words, in the 
Korean context, already institutionalized self-government by 
full-time professors (in particular at public universities) 
during the late 1980s might have been used (or was actually 
used) to block subsequent reforms based on the NPM 
principles17. In fact, this line of observation seems to provide 
a more plausible explanation as to why the NPM strategy as 
a guiding principle of higher education reforms has had 
difficulty taking root in Korean universities. 
In relation to this issue, in a slightly more theoretical 
vein, Braun and Merrien (1999) has argued that “[a] decisive 
precondition for the success of the new managerialism is the 
formation of a corporate identity of universities. Only when 
universities do regard themselves as individual competitors, 
operating in a 'quasi-market', and rearrange their internal 
organization according to the necessities which service 
delivery and contractualization demand, will it be possible to 
improve the efficiency and effectiveness of universities (p. 
25).” According to their argument, therefore, the current 
model of institutional governance in Korean public 
universities where ‘collegiality’ plays an important role, 
does not create preconditions for successful implementation 
of the NPM principles within universities. Seen from this 
perspective, without making changes to the ‘collegial’ 
decision making style, the goals of the NPM based reforms   
will be difficult to fulfill. 
Another explanation may come from the absence of a 
necessary coherence of government policies. The heavy 
emphasis on accountability without accompanying 
substantially increased institutional autonomy in particular 
for public universities; the ever-increasing rhetoric of 
‘maketization’, ‘provider competition’, ‘consumer choice’ 
without any effort to disclose necessary information (i.e., the 
results of institutional & program evaluation, more 
sophisticated information about institutional employment 
rates, research performance etc.) to the public in order for 
the educational consumers to make rational decisions are 
some examples in point. The lack of policy coherence can be 
partly explained by the strategy taken by the Presidential 
Commission on Education Reform. According to Park 
(2000), the Commission decided that politically highly 
sensitive issues would be dealt with later in order not to lose 
the momentum of reform by being plunged into intractable 
issues from the beginning. However, major legislative 
reforms introduced later - which are often a precondition for 
an ‘already introduced’ reform to work properly - have 
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largely failed because of intensive opposition from the 
vested interest groups which then resulted in a lack of 
coherence of government policies18. 
In relation to this issue, institutional autonomy should 
deserve special attention as institutional autonomy is indeed 
one of the most important pre-requisites for the NPM 
governance model to be able to function properly because 
where there is no autonomy, it makes little sense to assess 
institutional performance and to require accountability from 
the institution. 
As discussed earlier in Section 3.2, as far as public 
universities are concerned, institutional autonomy has not 
been increased to any great degree over the last two decades. 
The highly restricted nature of institutional autonomy of 
Korean public universities is mainly due to their legal status 
as a part of the government. As a corollary of this legal 
status, all organizational, financial, and personnel matters in 
public universities are therefore subject to governmental 
laws and budgetary regulations. Given this situation, there 
was no room for the NPM governance principles to play a 
role in improving system efficiency. ‘The draft Act on the 
National University Incorporation’ submitted to the National 
Assembly in June 2007 was in a sense the government’s 
response to cope with this situation19. The draft Act 
envisaged a drastic increase of institutional autonomy in all 
areas of university management by changing the legal status 
of national universities into public corporations. The 
prospects of the draft Act being passed by the National 
Assembly, however, do not seem bright at the moment due 
to strong resistance of academics, staff, and students as well 
as a significant number of assemblymen against the idea of 
incorporating the national universities. In any case, it is clear 
that, without increased institutional autonomy, the 
effectiveness of the new governance model based on the 
NPM principles would be significantly decreased, and that, 
maybe the only and viable solution to drastically increasing 
institutional autonomy of public universities, as manifest in 
the Japanese case (See Table 2 in Section 3), would be to 
change the legal status of public universities by separating 
them from the government. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
After a decade of reform efforts based on the NPM 
principles, despite all the rhetoric in government documents, 
the real working of the governance system in Korean higher 
education seems to have hardly changed at all. The new 
policy framework has had a very limited impact, if at all, at 
least up until now, on institutional and/or system 
performance in term of both international rankings of 
Korean universities and the general public’s belief or trust in 
the capability of Korean higher education institutions to 
survive in a highly competitive world higher education 
market20. This study has tried to show, above all, that the 
introduction of the new framework of governance based on 
the NPM principles could bring about a number of 
challenges rather than provide solutions if it is not 
accompanied by the necessary preconditions for the new 
governance model to be able to work properly. As such, it 
was indeed not the main point of this study whether or not a 
new governance model based on the NPM principles is 
better than other types of governance models. The real 
argument this study sought to make was that a more 
systematic and integrated implementation strategy would be 
needed to assure a successful implementation of the NPM 
principles in the reform of Korean higher education 
governance. Seen from this perspective, in the Korean 
context, without making changes to (1) the existing collegial 
self-government by full-time professors within universities 
and (2) the strong tradition of bureaucratic government 
control over university management, the NPM governance 
model will not be able to work effectively. 
After all, the concepts of accountability, institutional 
autonomy, and institutional leadership are all closely inter-
related. Thus, it is evident that: (1) an emphasis on 
accountability without accompanying increased institutional 
autonomy would lead either to ‘permanent immobilism’ with 
half-hearted compliance to the government policy or to mere 
market-driven organizations with ‘calculate frameworks’ 
where the academics are playing a ‘managerial game’ 
(Braun, 1999, p. 261); and that (2) an increased institutional 
autonomy without securing strong administrative leadership 
and nurturing an entrepreneurial culture within a university 
would also inevitably lead to under-performance of the 
overall system where, in the Korean context, only the built-
in interests of university constituencies (notably, professors) 
are likely to be protected and strengthened.  
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Notes 
 
1 Birnbaum(2000) provided a comprehensive analysis on 
management ‘fads’ in higher education which investigated a 
wide range of issues including: (1) what are academic 
management fads and where they come from?; (2) how they 
evolve, in other words, what is the life cycle of management 
fads?; (3) why they fail? and why they have been adopted even 
though they seemingly continuously fail?; and (4) what are some 
consequences and problems that they have contributed to in 
higher education and how educational administrators can deal 
with management fads? For those interested in these issues, see 
Birnbaum(2000). 
2 As used in OECD(2003), ‘higher education’ in the study refers to 
“universities and other tertiary institutions that award degrees 
and advanced research qualifications(p. 61).” There are many 
types of higher education institutions (i.e., 152 junior colleges, 
14 industrial universities, 11 universities for primary teacher 
education, and others) in Korea other than 175 universities in 
2006 (www.moe.go.kr).  
3 For detailed account of the principal theoretical bases for the new 
public management reforms, see Tolofari (2005). 
4 The public universities in this study refer to both ‘national 
(established by the central government)’ and ‘public (by local 
governments)’ universities unless otherwise specified. 
5 In 1924, the Japanese government established the Kyung-Sung 
Imperial University based on the model of the Japanese Imperial 
universities which was in turn modeled after the modern 
European universities such as the Berlin University in Germany. 
The Kyung-Sung Imperial University was reorganized, based on 
the U.S. public research university model, into the Seoul 
National University (SNU) in 1946 after liberation from 
Japanese colonial rule. The SNU was the first comprehensive 
modern Korean university that had undergraduate and graduate 
degree programs (Kim & Lee, 2004). Although the SNU was re-
organized based on the U.S. public research university model, 
because of strong opposition from the university community 
against the idea of introducing the U.S. style Board of Trustees 
in the SNU (so-called Guk-Dae-An-Pa-Dong, roughly translated 
into ‘Opposition movement against the Seoul National 
University establishment plan of 1946’), the governance 
structure of the SNU was different from that of the U.S. which 
was based on the principle of laymen or external control. 
According to Umakoshi (2000, pp. 163-187), the governance 
structure which most professors had in mind at that time was the 
model rooted in the Japanese Imperial Universities similar to the 
Humboldtian model in Europe where a University Senate (and a 
faculty senate at a faculty level) played an important role in 
university decision-making. 
6 In particular, from 1954, under an agreement between the SNU 
and the University of Minnesota in the U.S., around 300 SNU 
faculty members had a chance to study in the University of 
Minnesota which sparked a rush for many potential Korean 
professors to study in U.S. universities. For instance, according 
to Jung (1967 cited in Umakoshi, 2000), 62 percent of full-time 
professors in the SNU in 1967 had had experience of studying 
abroad with more than 80 percent of those professors studying in 
U.S. universities.  
7 Strict government control for private universities may sound odd 
for those who are not familiar with the Korean higher education 
system. In order to fully understand institutional autonomy in the 
Korean context, however, one should first take into account the 
unique characteristics of the Korean higher education 
development. One of the most conspicuous features of the 
Korean higher education system is the heavy reliance on private 
sector institutions. In fact, the enrollment share of the private 
sector for four-year universities in Korea was 79 percent in 
2006(MOE&HRD & KEDI, 2006). This heavy reliance on the 
private sector is largely due to the government’s strategy to 
mobilize private resources in expanding higher education so as to 
cope with a great demand for higher education and, at the same 
time, to overcome the severe budgetary constraints which existed 
at earlier stages of higher education development. However, as 
the government was focusing its financial resources almost 
exclusively on public universities, and the enrollment quotas for 
universities, regardless of their legal status (private or public) 
were strictly controlled by the government to maintain quality of 
education, most private universities suffered chronic problems of 
financial deficiency. The response of private universities to the 
situation was to retain as many illegal admissions as possible 
regardless of the educational capacity or qualifications of the 
applicants to make more profits which often led to corruption or 
embezzlement. As these practices by many private universities 
created serious social problems, the military government 
introduced strict regulations to control the administration of 
private universities in 1963 in the form of ‘the Private School 
Act.’ From that time on, the Korean government has maintained 
heavy control over most aspects of private university 
administration as well (Kim & Lee, 2004; Lee, 2000a; Umakoshi, 
2000).  
8 As a part of the implementation process of ‘the May 31 education 
reform’, ‘the Educational Deregulation Committee’ was 
introduced in 1995 in the Ministry of Education which has 
vigorously committed to deregulation in a wide range of 
educational administration since then (Park, 2000). Moreover, in 
2007, ‘the Deregulation Committee for Higher Education’ was 
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newly established and recommended a comprehensive 
deregulation plan for higher education which was primarily 
based on the opinions suggested by higher education institutions 
themselves in several rounds of a consultation process. But, 
overall, it seems that this plan will not fundamentally change the 
current highly restricted nature of institutional autonomy in 
Korean public universities as it also did not address the issue of 
the legal status of public universities as an underlying reason for 
the restricted institutional autonomy.  
9 For more information regarding these programs, see Moon & Kim 
(2001); and Ryu et al. (2006).  
10 This section will focus mainly on institutional governance in 
public universities. Institutional governance in private 
universities has quite a different history and is based on different 
rationales. The governance structure of private universities is 
stipulated in ‘the Private School Act’ which is very similar, in 
substance, to a U.S. model: a Board of Trustees as a supreme 
decision making body and the president as a chief executive 
officer. However, on taking a closer look at the composition and 
actual operation of the Board, one can easily recognize that the 
situation is totally different between the two countries. One of 
the chronic problems of some private universities (mainly, less 
prestigious, smaller private universities) was the strong influence 
of the founders of the institutions and his/her spouse & relatives 
over all aspects of university operations which frequently lead to 
internal conflicts and/or corruption. The main issue in private 
university governance reforms over the past two decades was 
indeed how to effectively introduce more external members on to 
the Board of private institutions to protect wider public interests 
from those founders of private institutions. In other words, the 
emphasis was put on the promotion of broader social 
democratization, not on the implantation of the business mind 
into private university management. It would be interesting to 
fully investigate this issue, but it is obviously beyond the scope 
of this study.  
11 According to Byun (2007), the traditional form of institutional 
governance until the late 1980s in Korea can be classified as ‘a 
rector dictatorship model’ where the rector (or president) is the 
sole authority to make final decisions regarding institutional 
management as well as to implement them together. For the 
purpose of this study, however, ‘a rector dictatorship model’ is 
regarded as a unique form of the executive leadership model. For 
in-depth exploration of this issue, see Byun (2007).  
12 The University Senate is generally composed of full-time 
professors only. The involvement of the university constituencies 
other than full-time professors in university decision making has 
been very limited in Korea. Student representation is not allowed 
in the Senate which seems to be very odd considering 
international trends widening the opportunities for students to 
participate in the governing body (See, for example, Byun, 2007). 
Administrative staff have voiced their rights to participate in the 
university decision making process and have recently made some 
progress (i.e., some universities including the SNU allowed the 
administrative staff to take part in the election of the president 
with less weight given to their votes). But, overall, the 
administrative staff’s role in institutional governance still 
remains extremely limited in Korea.  
13 In the case of the SNU, the Senate has the final say for the 
following matters: (1) Basic direction for education and the 
management of academic affairs; (2) establishment and 
abolishment of colleges and graduate schools within the SNU 
and affiliated facilities; (3) establishment and abolishment of 
academic programs (i.e., faculties and departments); (4) Basic 
principles on personnel policy for academic staff; (5) Selection 
method of the final candidate for the university president (whose 
name will then be submitted to the government for approval –as 
a pure formality); and (6) Revision of the university statute and 
other regulations in relation to the items pertaining to the 
aforementioned matters. Although the president reserves the 
right to submit the Senate’s decision for reconsideration, the 
Senate’s decision will be finalized if the Senate passes a 
resolution again by a majority of two-thirds or more (The SNU 
Statute, Clause 42 on the University Senate). 
14 The University Senate of the SNU is composed of 54 professors 
elected among and by full-time professors and 13 external 
members appointed by the university president. According to 
recent statistics provided by the senate secretariat at the SNU, 
however, the average attendance rate of these external members 
for a general meeting of the Senate has been less than a quarter 
percent over the past four years (from Nov. 1, 2003 to Sep. 11, 
2007). 
15 A similar argument for the Lituanian universities may be found 
in Želvys (2004). 
16 A similar observation for the Eastern and Central European 
countries which experienced communist regimes may be found 
in de Boer and Goedegebuure (2003). 
17 The subsequent developments in the 1990s and afterwards with 
regard to the implementation of the NPM-based reforms seem to 
justify this concern.  
18 Recently in May 2007, the Korean Assembly passed ‘the Special 
Act on disclosing the information of education-related 
institutions.’ According to the Act, from 2008, all higher 
education institutions must release, more than once a year, such 
key information as employment rate, research performance, level 
of tuition, financial situation to the public. However, given the 
year-long strong opposition from the group of less prestigious 
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universities, whether or not the system works properly in line 
with the original intention stipulated in the Act remains to be 
seen. 
19 The proposed Act on National University Incorporation is a 
comprehensive package of government reforms which contains 
most of the elements of the NPM governance principles. The 
main elements of the proposed act include: (1) the transformation 
of national universities into a national university corporation thus 
drastically increasing autonomy of individual institutions; (2) 
introduction of a four-year performance contract between the 
central government and each individual university; (3) 
establishment of a governing board (benchmarked conceptually 
from a U.S. style Board of Trustees) within individual 
institutions composed of 15 appointed members with an external 
majority; and (4) granting the final authority of determining a 
university president to the board. 
20 In terms of ‘university education meeting the needs of a 
competitive economy’, Korean university education ranked 40th 
out of 55 countries included in the 2007 IMD World 
Competitiveness Survey. Although there is an indication that the 
situation in Korea has gradually improved as shown by a yearly 
performance of this rank (59 th in 2004  52 nd in 2005  50th in 
2006  40 th in 2007), the level of satisfaction towards university 
education perceived by the business world seems still fairly low 
as suggested by the moderately low score of 4.46 on this survey 
item on a 10 point (maximum) scale (IMD, World 
Competitiveness Yearbook 2007). 
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